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Michael D. Cicchini ∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutorial misconduct has infected every stage of the criminal 
process ranging from the initial charging decision through post-
conviction proceedings.  However, misconduct at the trial stage poses 
a unique set of difficulties for individuals accused of crimes, and is 
the focus of this Article.  Trial misconduct includes, most commonly, 
improper opening statements, improper examination of witnesses, 
and improper closing arguments. 
Trial misconduct is worthy of attention due to its tremendous 
negative effect on both the defendant and society more generally.  
With regard to the defendant, the misconduct may directly violate 
numerous constitutional and other rights.  For example, a prosecu-
tor’s closing argument may incorporate factual assertions that are 
blatantly false or, even if true, that were never testified to or otherwise 
introduced at trial.  Such misconduct violates the defendant’s Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process right to a fair trial as well as the 
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.1  Trial misconduct 
also compromises the appearance of a fair trial, which undermines 
the integrity of the criminal process and consequently harms society 
generally.2
The current legal framework for dealing with prosecutorial mis-
conduct relies exclusively on judicial discretion.  When a prosecutor 
commits misconduct, and the defendant requests a mistrial as the 
remedy, the trial judge is required to step into the shoes of the jury.  
The judge must weigh the evidence and decide whether, in light of 
 ∗ J.D., summa cum laude, Marquette University Law School (1999); C.P.A., Illinois 
Board of Examiners (1997); M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate School (1994); 
B.S., University of Wisconsin—Parkside (1990). 
 1 See, e.g., Douglass v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
 2 See Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: 
Case Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 958–59 (1998). 
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all the evidence against a defendant, the impact of the misconduct 
was significant enough to warrant the requested mistrial.3
This approach is not only flawed on a fundamental level, in that 
it transfers the jury’s role to the judge, but also has proven completely 
ineffective in its application.  Decades of court decisions have proved 
that judges will rarely grant a defendant’s request for mistrial no mat-
ter how blatant or harmful the prosecutor’s misconduct.4  In the rare 
case that a mistrial is granted or a conviction is reversed on appeal, 
courts nearly always allow prosecutors to retry the defendant, often 
with a stronger case, in a subsequent trial or trials.5  This use of judi-
cial discretion consistently permits, and in fact encourages, even the 
most flagrant forms of prosecutorial misconduct.6
This Article proposes eliminating judicial discretion when deal-
ing with prosecutorial misconduct.  More specifically, upon a finding 
of prosecutorial misconduct and a defendant’s subsequent motion 
for a mistrial, the mistrial should be granted without any judicial de-
termination of whether the defendant would be found guilty absent 
the misconduct.7  Further, in cases of intentional prosecutorial mis-
conduct, subsequent retrial of the defendant should be barred.8
This proposal is supported by analogy to recent case law in Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence, where the Supreme Court elimi-
nated the use of judicial discretion in order to protect and ensure de-
fendants’ Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.9  Before the 
recent Supreme Court case of Crawford v. Washington,10 when a prose-
cutor would offer hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant at 
trial, the trial judge was required to use a judicial balancing test to de-
termine whether that hearsay was reliable, and consequently, admis-
sible.11  After decades of watching lower courts find reliability in even 
“testimonial hearsay”12—the type of hearsay with the most “potential 
 3 E.g., State v. Bunch, 529 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (“The trial court 
must determine, in light of the whole proceeding, whether the basis for the mistrial 
request is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.”). 
 4 See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 425 
(1992). 
 5 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 911. 
 6 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 7 See infra Part IV.A. 
 8 See infra Part IV.A. 
 9 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 10 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 11 Id. at 40 (discussing Ohio v. Roberts, 488 U.S. 56 (1980)). 
 12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. 
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for prosecutorial abuse”13 —the Court in Crawford finally ended the 
use of judicial discretion.  Instead, Crawford now requires testing the 
reliability of hearsay evidence through cross-examination in front of a 
jury, as the Framers of the Confrontation Clause intended.14
The pre-Crawford problem of admitting testimonial hearsay is 
closely analogous in every significant way to the problem of dealing 
with prosecutorial misconduct at trial.15  In each situation, the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights are compromised due to the potential for 
prosecutorial abuse or, in the case of prosecutorial misconduct, ac-
tual prosecutorial abuse.  In each situation, the function of weighing 
evidence and evaluating its credibility and reliability has been im-
properly taken from the jury and transferred to the judge.  In each 
situation, decades of court decisions prove that the use of judicial dis-
cretion has completely failed in protecting those basic constitutional 
rights.  Finally, in each situation, the solution to the problem is the 
same: eliminate the use of judicial discretion and require that evi-
dence, free of improper prosecutorial taint, be weighed and evalu-
ated by the jury. 
Part II of this Article provides examples of prosecutorial mis-
conduct and discusses the harm caused by the misconduct.  Part III 
details the existing legal framework for dealing with misconduct, and 
also illustrates how the use of judicial discretion is its fundamental 
flaw.  Part IV proposes a better framework for dealing with prosecuto-
rial misconduct at trial and discusses its rationale and logical support 
from Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  Part V anticipates and ad-
dresses the likely arguments in opposition to the proposed rule and 
includes a discussion of alternative curative measures, professional 
discipline of prosecutors, and judicial costs and efficiency.  Part VI 
concludes the Article. 
II. UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Developing a framework for dealing with prosecutorial miscon-
duct at trial first requires an understanding of the prosecutor’s role 
in the criminal process, what actions constitute prosecutorial miscon-
duct, and the harmful impact of the misconduct. 
 13 Id. at 56. 
 14 Id. at 67–68. 
 15 See infra Part IV.B. 
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A. The Prosecutor’s Role and Examples of Misconduct 
1. The Problem with “Doing Justice” 
In most of the case law and legal commentary addressing prose-
cutorial misconduct, judges and authors typically discuss the prosecu-
tor’s unique set of responsibilities in the criminal justice system.  In 
addition to advocating for his client—the state or the federal gov-
ernment—the prosecutor also takes on a second role within the sys-
tem. 
This dual role requires the prosecutor to vigorously advocate on 
behalf of the government and to ensure the administration of jus-
tice.  Therefore, the state prosecutor’s [second] role, as “minister 
of justice,” is often referred to as a “quasi-judicial” position.  This 
quasi-judicial role mandates that the prosecutor be held to a par-
ticular standard of behavior commonly alluded to as the “do jus-
tice” standard.16
Although this lofty goal of “doing justice” is very noble, it is also 
very vague and impractical.  Additionally, acting as “minister of jus-
tice” will, in some cases, directly conflict with the prosecutor’s role as 
advocate.  “Precisely how far the prosecutor is required to go in this 
direction [as minister of justice] is a matter of debate and varies in 
different jurisdictions.”17
In reality, however, the problem of prosecutorial misconduct is 
much clearer.  Prosecutors rarely, if ever, commit misconduct by fail-
ing to live up to some lofty, vague standard.  Instead, prosecutors 
commit misconduct by violating “well-established” trial rules—rules 
set forth in case law, statutes, ethical codes, and court orders—many 
of which apply equally to both the prosecutor and the defense coun-
sel.18  As the Supreme Court of New Mexico noted, “[r]are are the in-
stances of misconduct that are not violations of rules that every legal 
professional, no matter how inexperienced, is charged with know-
ing.”19
In light of this practical reality, any discussion of an idealistic, 
dual role of the prosecutor is not only unnecessary, but also counter-
productive.  Such a discussion merely detracts from the real issue of 
 16 Tara J. Tobin, Note, Miscarriage of Justice During Closing Arguments by an Overzeal-
ous Prosecutor and a Timid Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 45 S.D. L. REV. 186, 206 
(2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 17 WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:3.8. 
 18 See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 910 (“Regarding the existence of misconduct 
itself, the criteria are well-established, as set forth in a number of cases . . . .”). 
 19 State v. Breit, 1996-NMSC-67, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792, 803. 
CICCHINIFINAL 1/15/2007  12:08:01 PM 
2007] PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 339 
 
dealing with prosecutors’ blatant, and usually intentional, violations 
of well-established rules of trial practice.20  Consequently, this Article 
ignores the loftier debate, and instead focuses on the prosecutor’s 
role as advocate and the requirement that he act within the bounds 
of clear, well-established precedent governing prosecutor behavior. 
2. Examples of Misconduct throughout the Criminal 
Process 
With this narrower, more practical view of prosecutorial miscon-
duct as the proper focus, identifying misconduct becomes a far more 
manageable task.21  Prosecutors commit misconduct at all stages of 
the criminal process, including before and after trial.  For example, 
misconduct occurs as early as the charging decision itself when 
prosecutors criminally charge individuals based on improper consid-
erations such as race, gender, or religion.22  Misconduct also occurs 
when, after a prosecutor decides to charge a defendant, charging is 
delayed in order to gain an improper advantage or to harass the de-
fendant.23
After charges have been filed, prosecutors engage in misconduct 
by including false information in the charging document in order to 
ensure a finding of probable cause and to keep the defendant in the 
criminal process.24  Prosecutors also use their considerable power, 
and nearly unlimited discretion, to retaliate against defendants when 
defendants choose to exercise their constitutional rights.  Most com-
monly, this includes bringing more severe charges as punishment 
when a defendant demands a jury trial or pursues and wins an ap-
peal.25
Misconduct also occurs in other ways prior to trial.  For example, 
prosecutors may withhold exculpatory or other discoverable evidence 
from the defendant in order to increase their chances of winning a 
 20 See Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets 
Brady, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1136 (2005) (arguing that, with regard to the 
prosecutor’s violation of discovery obligations, “[r]elying on the image of the prose-
cutor as ‘doing justice’ distracts from finding a real solution to the problem of non-
disclosure”). 
 21 In one sense, identifying prosecutorial misconduct is very difficult in that most 
misconduct will never be detected.  That which is detected is usually discovered by 
chance.  See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 959.  However, assuming that the misconduct 
occurs above-board, as it necessarily would at jury trial, identifying what constitutes 
misconduct is quite easy when focusing on well-established rules of trial procedure. 
 22 See, e.g., State v. Kramer, 2001 WI 132, 248 Wis. 2d 1009, 637 N.W.2d 35. 
 23 See, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984). 
 24 See, e.g., State v. Mann, 367 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Wis. 1985). 
 25 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1982). 
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conviction.26  In cases resolved by plea agreement, prosecutors may 
commit misconduct by breaching the terms of the agreement entered 
into with the defendant.  Often the prosecutor will breach the terms 
covertly by having others do or say that which the prosecutor has 
promised not to do or say.27  Even after conviction and sentencing, 
there are numerous additional opportunities for prosecutorial mis-
conduct.28
3. Examples of Trial Misconduct 
Despite the tremendous harm that can come from the miscon-
duct illustrated above, the focus of this Article is on prosecutorial mis-
conduct at trial.  The reason is not that the harm of trial misconduct 
is any greater than that of other misconduct—what can be more 
harmful than bringing a citizen into the criminal process in the first 
place based on materially false information?  Rather, this Article’s fo-
cus is on trial misconduct because it poses a particular set of difficul-
ties for the defendant and his counsel. 
The problem with trial misconduct, unlike misconduct at other 
stages of the criminal process, is that although the misconduct itself is 
usually well conceived and calculated, its timing prevents defense 
counsel from making a reasoned, strategic decision on how to 
counter the misconduct.  For example, with regard to trial miscon-
duct in Arkansas, one commentator has written: 
[I]n making the decision to object to improper argument, de-
fense counsel is forced to make a number of subjective assess-
ments concerning the potential prejudice which may result from 
the argument itself, or an adverse ruling on the objection by the 
trial court.  . . . [C]ounsel is left with little time to consider 
whether an objection is appropriate; whether even a favorable rul-
ing is likely to cure prejudice; and whether, in the context of the 
evidence developed at trial, relief in the form of mistrial is prefer-
able to continuing to verdict.29
 26 See Hoeffel, supra note 20, at 1134 . 
 27 See, e.g., State v. Howland, 2003 WI App 104, 264 Wis. 2d 279, 663 N.W.2d 340 
(holding that when the district attorney agrees, pursuant to plea agreement, to make 
no specific sentencing recommendation, and then contacts the Division of Commu-
nity Corrections multiple times to urge it to change its sentencing recommendation 
from probation to imprisonment, the district attorney’s actions constitute an end-run 
around, and breach of, the plea agreement). 
 28 See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Con-
victions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171 (2005). 
 29 J. Thomas Sullivan, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Arkansas 
Criminal Trials, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 213, 215 (1998). 
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Examples of trial misconduct include: striking potential jurors 
based on race or some other protected classification;30 referencing 
inadmissible facts in opening statements;31 asking improper questions 
of witnesses to elicit inadmissible facts or make assertions that are un-
true;32 and making improper closing arguments.33  Trial misconduct 
can also occur outside of the courtroom.  For example, prosecutors 
have coerced and threatened witnesses to keep them from testifying 
for the defendant,34 and have given key government witnesses “ex-
traordinary favors” including “access to drugs, cash, clothing, and 
other amenities.”35
Improper closing arguments, however, are probably the most 
common and the most visible form of trial misconduct.  This type of 
misconduct poses yet an additional problem for defense counsel: 
“[I]n most cases, the prosecutor’s final closing argument will be the 
last words that the . . . jury hears from either attorney.”36  “Psychology 
teaches that . . . the last words a listener hears will also be long re-
membered.  Again, human experience validates this psychological 
concept.  There is no one among us who does not want to have the 
last word in an argument.”37
Indeed, the potential impact of misconduct in closing argu-
ments is especially high.  Furthermore, the means of committing mis-
conduct in closing argument are limited only by a prosecutor’s 
imagination, and can range from the blatantly obvious to the subtle 
and deceptive.  For example, prosecutors have argued that a defen-
dant’s failure to testify is evidence of his guilt, thereby violating his 
Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial.38  A more subtle ap-
proach, but also a Fifth Amendment violation, is to argue that the de-
fense did not rebut a particular piece of evidence, when the only way 
to do so would have been through the defendant’s testimony when 
the defendant chose not to testify.39
 30 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 31 See, e.g., State v. Tew, 195 N.W.2d 615 (Wis. 1972). 
 32 See, e.g., Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 33 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 34 See, e.g., Kitchen v. United States, 227 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Gardner, 238 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 35 See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 934 (citing United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 
244–45 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
 36 Welsh White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing Prohibi-
tions on Improper Penalty Trial Arguments, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2002). 
 37 LARRY S. POZNER & ROGER J. DODD, CROSS-EXAMINATION: SCIENCE AND 
TECHNIQUES 501 (The Michie Company 1993). 
 38 See, e.g., Griffin, 380 U.S. at 610–11. 
 39 See, e.g., United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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Other types of improper closing arguments include: making as-
sertions that are false or, even if true, were not introduced into evi-
dence;40 diverting jurors’ attention from the evidence by appealing to 
their fears or self-interest;41 vouching for the credibility of govern-
ment witnesses;42 disparaging defense counsel or the defendant;43 
misstating the law;44 shifting the burden of proof to the defendant;45 
and appealing to jurors’ racial bias.46
B. Misconduct—What’s the Harm? 
1. Harm to the Accused 
“Those who have experienced the full thrust of the power of 
government when leveled against them know that the only protection 
the citizen has is in the requirement for a fair trial.”47  Prosecutorial 
misconduct compromises, at a minimum, “an aspect of a fair trial 
which is implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by which the States are bound.”48
This concept of a fair trial “requires that the procedures used to 
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant comport with 
fundamental ideas of fair play and justice.”49  When a prosecutor vio-
lates rules of trial conduct—the very things that define fair play—the 
right to a fair trial is implicated.  While any misconduct compromises 
the right, the more flagrant, intentional, and repetitive the miscon-
duct, the greater the resulting harm. 
In addition, misconduct violates numerous other constitutional 
and statutory rights.  For example, if a prosecutor directly or indi-
rectly comments in closing argument on the defendant’s failure to 
testify, as described above, the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination is violated.50  Likewise, when a prosecutor argues that a 
 40 See, e.g., United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 524 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 41 See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 54 F.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 42 See, e.g., United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 43 See, e.g., United States v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 44 See, e.g., Cunningham, 54 F.3d at 300–01. 
 45 See, e.g., United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 46 See, e.g., Aliwoli v. Carter, 225 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 47 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 651 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 48 Id. at 649. 
 49 Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and Due Process: 
There’s More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1299 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 50 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (finding comments on a de-
fendant’s failure to testify to be improper argument); United States v. Cotnam, 88 
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defendant charged with drug crimes was able to post bail precisely 
because he is a drug dealer, the comment not only affects “the fair-
ness of the verdict,” but also has a “potential effect on the Eighth 
Amendment rights of defendants” to post bond.51  “By analogy to 
comments on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment right not to tes-
tify, such comments are improper because they cut down on a consti-
tutional privilege[,] here the privilege of posting bond once it is 
set[,] by making its assertion costly.”52
Perhaps the most harmful, yet often overlooked, type of prose-
cutorial misconduct is that which violates a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his accuser.  When a prosecutor states 
or argues facts not in evidence, the jury hears and considers this in-
formation, yet the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine or 
challenge the allegations because no witness was ever called to tes-
tify.53  This Sixth Amendment violation can occur not only during the 
closing argument, but also during the opening statement and during 
the examination of witnesses.54
It is not so much the violation of these rights in the abstract that 
is harmful to the defendant.  Instead, it is the very real consequences 
that the defendant suffers when these rights are violated.  Most sig-
nificantly, these consequences include false convictions55 which in 
turn result in “lengthy incarceration, financial ruin, and, in a number 
of instances, sentences of death.”56  Even in cases of acquittals, inno-
cent defendants still suffer stress, anxiety, long periods of incarcera-
tion, and tremendous financial costs. 
2. Societal Harm Generally 
Prosecutorial misconduct harms not only the individual accused 
of the crime, but also society more generally.  First, “[t]he reversal of 
a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, 
F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding indirect comments on a defendant’s failure to tes-
tify to be improper argument). 
 51 United States. v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 52 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 53 See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); see also United States v. Brisk, 171 
F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
argued that the defendant engaged in drug activities in front of his children when no 
such evidence was ever presented). 
 54 See, e.g., State v. Bannister, 2006 WI App 136, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 447, 720 
N.W.2d 498 (Fine, J., concurring). 
 55 See Hoeffel, supra note 20, at 1148 (citing studies that show a large number of 
convictions reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct, particularly misconduct in-
volving concealing evidence or presenting false evidence). 
 56 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 958. 
CICCHINIFINAL 1/15/2007  12:08:01 PM 
344 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:335 
 
courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, 
energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once 
taken place.”57  Even more costly than a reversal, when left unchecked 
the misconduct undermines the integrity of the system itself, thereby 
threatening the equally important appearance of a fair trial. 
Beyond the drain on precious resources through wasted trial pro-
ceedings and protracted post-trial proceedings in the individual 
cases, there is an incalculable cost in damaged integrity [to the 
judicial system itself] that may be difficult to repair, and which af-
fects the social fabric in a manner that implicates more wide-
spread consequences.58
Simply stated, “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are con-
victed but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administra-
tion of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”59  Con-
versely, “[i]ntentional wrongdoing in court by perhaps the most 
critical member of the government law enforcement team [the 
prosecutor] calls into question the fairness and integrity of the 
trial.”60
III. THE EXISTING LAW AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL FLAW:  
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
A. The Three-Step Test 
The current law governing prosecutorial misconduct at trial 
mandates a three-step analysis.  First, when the defendant objects to 
the alleged misconduct by the prosecutor, e.g., improper closing ar-
gument, the court must make a finding as to whether the prosecu-
tor’s actions in fact constitute misconduct.61  The judge implicitly 
makes this finding by either sustaining or overruling the defendant’s 
objection.  This step of the analysis is usually not a problem and is not 
the subject of much debate.  Courts are quite capable of identifying 
improper conduct and are usually willing to sustain objections, 
thereby finding that the misconduct occurred.62
 57 Fisher, supra note 49, at 1301 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 
72 (1986)). 
 58 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 958. 
 59 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 60 Paul J. Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent 
in Appellate Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 131 (1999). 
 61 See, e.g., State v. Bunch, 529 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
 62 E.g., Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2000) (“During the course 
of proceedings, the prosecutor made a variety of inappropriate remarks . . . .  How-
ard objected to each of these and, in all cases, the trial judge sustained the objection 
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Second, after finding that the prosecutor committed the mis-
conduct, the trial court must decide the proper remedy.63  Assuming 
the defendant requests a curative instruction and the court grants the 
request, the problem is resolved and the trial moves on.  However, 
when the defendant requests a mistrial, “[t]he trial court must de-
termine, in light of the whole proceeding, whether the basis for the 
mistrial request is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial.”64
Under this standard, the trial court is required to step into the 
shoes of the jury, weigh the evidence and, if the court believes the de-
fendant would be found guilty even without the misconduct, not 
grant the mistrial as a remedy.65  This requires a tremendous amount 
of judicial discretion, including the analysis of “mannerisms, expres-
sions, and demeanor of the parties in determining whether to grant a 
mistrial.”66  If the defendant is convicted and subsequently appeals 
the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial, the appellate court engages 
in essentially the same analysis, and often will simply defer to the trial 
court’s decision.67
Third, in the rare case that a mistrial is granted, or a conviction 
is reversed on appeal, the trial court must later decide whether retrial 
of the defendant is barred by double jeopardy protections.68  Under 
current federal law and most state law, double jeopardy protection 
only attaches when the court finds that the prosecutorial misconduct 
“was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.”69  
Even if the court determines that the prosecutor committed the mis-
. . . .”); see also Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 910 (“Regarding the existence of miscon-
duct itself, the criteria are well-established, as set forth in a number of cases . . . .”).  
But cf. State v. Smith, No. 2005AP1617-CR (Wis. Ct. App. May 17, 2006) (on file with 
author) (overruling the defendant’s objection to the prosecutor introducing facts 
not in evidence and shifting the burden of proof to the defendant). 
 63 See, e.g., Bunch, 529 N.W.2d at 925. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See, e.g., Howard, 225 F.3d at 793 (weighing testimony of witnesses and holding 
that the prosecutor’s misconduct “did not go to the heart of the prosecution’s case”); 
United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing the trial 
judge’s duty to determine the impact of the improper conduct); United States v. 
Steward, 977 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 
1067 (8th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 66 Sullivan, supra note 29, at 257 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 67 See, e.g., Bunch, 529 N.W.2d at 925 (“The decision whether to grant a motion 
for a mistrial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court” to which the appel-
late court will give “great deference.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Haar, 931 
F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing the great level of deference afforded to the 
trial judge’s ruling). 
 68 See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982). 
 69 Id. at 679. 
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conduct with the intent to “prevail at trial by impermissible means” 
rather than provoke a request for mistrial, the defendant is offered 
no double jeopardy protection and may be retried.70
B. The Problem with Judicial Discretion 
The use of judicial discretion, at both the trial and appellate 
level, to deal with prosecutorial misconduct is a fundamentally flawed 
concept.  It essentially transfers the jury’s role to the judge, and al-
lows the judge to make a finding of guilt by hypothetically weighing 
the evidence as though the misconduct had not occurred.  That judi-
cial finding of guilt is then used as the basis to hold that the miscon-
duct does not warrant a new trial. 
“[S]trong evidence of guilt [as determined by the judge] elimi-
nates any lingering doubt that the prosecutor’s remarks unfairly 
prejudiced the jury’s deliberations.”71  Consequently, if the defendant 
is “obviously guilty” in the eyes of the judge, he is therefore not enti-
tled to a fair trial untainted by prosecutorial abuse.72  “The absurdity 
of this rationale begs for a better solution.”73
Aside from being fundamentally flawed on the most basic level, 
the existing framework for dealing with prosecutorial misconduct is 
difficult, if not impossible, to apply with any level of accuracy or con-
sistency.  Judges weigh the evidence and attach varying levels of sig-
nificance to each piece of evidence, but “no court knows what influ-
enced a particular jury’s verdict of guilt in any particular case.”74  This 
judicial determination of guilt, even if done in good faith, is nothing 
more than guesswork for what the jury would have done.  In fact, sev-
eral authors point to “sufficient empirical data to support an asser-
tion that judges do a poor job of evaluating the importance jurors at-
tach to specific issues and evidence.” 75
 70 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 936.  The absurdity of this rule is also addressed in-
fra Part III.B.3. 
 71 Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. 
Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 431–32 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 72 Gershman, supra note 4, at 426 (citations omitted). 
 73 Tobin, supra note 16, at 235. 
 74 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 647 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(Frank, J., dissenting). 
 75 Robert L. Gernon, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Kansas: Still Hazy After All These 
Years, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 245, 252 (2002)(citing Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking 
Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79 (1988) (internal quotations omit-
ted)). 
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Even more problematic, judges actually refuse to exercise their 
discretion in good faith, and instead engage in “judicial hypocrisy”76 
by, on the one hand, condemning the misconduct and acknowledg-
ing its harm, and on the other hand, doing nothing to protect the 
very rights that have been violated.77  In even the most extreme cases 
of prosecutorial misconduct, judges consistently find that the mis-
conduct could not possibly have influenced the jury’s decision, and 
therefore refuse to grant mistrials.78  The use of judicial discretion 
has become nothing more than a “judicial weapon to preserve convic-
tions” as courts routinely dispense with the problem by finding “that 
the defendant is clearly guilty.”79  This judicial finding of guilt, in 
turn, is used as the basis to label the misconduct as harmless and al-
low it to stand. 
Finally, in the rare case that mistrial is granted or a conviction is 
reversed due to a prosecutor’s misconduct, the use of judicial discre-
tion virtually guarantees the prosecutor the opportunity for successive 
prosecutions of the accused.  This results from the courts’ willingness 
to repeatedly find that the misconduct was merely intended to win a 
conviction by improper means, rather than intended to provoke a 
mistrial.  This is clearly a distinction without a meaningful difference 
and, as a practical matter, is a distinction that is impossible to draw.  
Yet it is this very distinction that is used to reward the government 
with the opportunity for successive prosecutions. 
1. The Courts’ Refusal to Ensure a Fair Trial 
The first issue that must be decided by the trial court, and later 
by the appellate court upon review, is whether the prosecutor’s mis-
conduct warrants a new trial for the defendant.  The trial court, with 
the desire to avoid a second trial, and in light of what is often a “very 
 76 Interview with Terry W. Rose, Attorney, in Kenosha, Wis. (May 26, 2006). 
 77 See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 189 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“Today’s opinion, however, reveals a Court willing to tolerate not only imperfection 
but a level of fairness and reliability so low it should make conscientious prosecutors 
cringe.”). 
 78 See id. at 192 (allowing the prosecutor to employ a “relentless and single-
minded attempt to inflame the jury,” including the expression of personal beliefs, 
commenting on the credibility of witnesses, arguing that the only way to prevent fu-
ture crime is to impose the death penalty, calling the defendant “an animal,” and 
stating that someone should have “blown [the defendant’s] head off”); see also Don-
nelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 
155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); State v. Smith, 1999 SD 83, 599 N.W.2d 344; State v. 
Jackson, 2005 WI App 176, 285 Wis. 2d 804, 701 N.W.2d 652., 
 79 Gershman, supra note 4, at 425. 
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close and ongoing relationship” with the prosecutor,80 weighs the evi-
dence and nearly always finds that the misconduct would not have af-
fected the outcome of the trial.  Then, upon appellate review, this 
same “approach allows the appellate court to act as fact-finder and 
disregard prosecutorial errors because of its own belief in the defen-
dant’s guilt.”81  Often, the appellate court refuses to even make such a 
determination and simply defers to the trial court’s ruling.82
This current system has the propensity to permit, and in fact en-
courage, even the most flagrant cases of prosecutorial misconduct.  
Upon finding misconduct, “at best, judges offer condemnation for 
the arguments and admonishment of the prosecutors,”83 without pro-
viding any effective deterrent for future misconduct or any protection 
for the defendant’s rights.  The courts’ admonitions, at best, ring hol-
low, and at worst, have the perverse effect of encouraging prosecutors 
to commit further acts of misconduct.  As one California court ac-
knowledged: 
This court has had occasion to twice address at length [the prose-
cutor’s] attitude toward, and treatment of, the judge, opposing 
counsel, witnesses, defendants, jurors and others in the court-
room . . . . 
     Consequently, it is disheartening, to say the least, to learn that 
she takes “pride” in our admonitions, apparently because we did 
not reverse the judgment rendered.  We most earnestly urge 
counsel to reconsider her approach lest in the future it becomes 
necessary for us to reverse otherwise sustainable convictions . . . .84
This particular court’s admonition illustrates that “[t]here is lit-
tle doubt that prosecutors [commit the misconduct] with full knowl-
edge that they are committing a constitutional violation . . . despite 
repeated criticism by the appellate courts.”85
 80 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 912. 
 81 Brian C. Duffy, Note, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per Se Reversible-Error 
Rule for Prosecutors’ Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1351 (1997). 
 82 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 742 S.W.2d 932, 935–36 (Ark. 1988) (“It is a serious 
matter when an attorney attempts to appeal to the prejudice of the jury by arguing 
matters outside of the record.  However, we usually defer to the trial court in the ex-
ercise of discretion in such matters.”). 
 83 Duffy, supra note 81, at 1344–45 (citations omitted). 
 84 Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 123 (citing People v. Congious, No. B0202709 
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987)). 
 85 Gershman, supra note 4, at 429. 
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2. An Intra-Court Illustration 
The ineffectiveness of judicial discretion, as well as the outright 
“judicial hypocrisy” evident in these decisions, is highlighted even 
further when looking within a single state and, even more narrowly, 
within a single appellate district within that state.  In contrast to look-
ing across jurisdictions, this intra-court view better illustrates the 
prosecutors’ willingness to continually ignore the law, as well as the 
courts’ continued tolerance and even encouragement of that behav-
ior.  This phenomenon can be seen within any state and any appel-
late district, such as the California example, above.  Another excel-
lent illustration is Wisconsin’s second district appellate court and a 
string of its recent cases. 
(a) State v. Jackson: An Empty Warning to Prosecutors 
In State v. Jackson86 the defendant was convicted of four counts 
based on a sole act of alleged criminal recklessness.  On appeal, the 
court agreed with the trial court that the prosecutor committed mis-
conduct on multiple occasions throughout trial, from opening state-
ment to closing argument.87  The prosecutor’s misconduct included 
expressing a personal belief about the evidence, vouching for wit-
nesses, disparaging defense counsel, and attempting to shift the bur-
den of proof from the state to the defendant.88  Just one of the nu-
merous violations was the prosecutor’s argument to the jury that “my 
job is to tell you what the truth is [and] present all of the witnesses to 
you. . . .  [Defense counsel’s] job is to try to get your attention fo-
cused somewhere else, use innuendo, try to make you speculate.  Her 
job is to try and get the guy off.  That’s it.”89
The appellate court analyzed the prosecutor’s numerous acts of 
misconduct by stepping into the shoes of the jury and weighing the 
evidence.  This evidence, in its entirety, consisted only of three eye-
witnesses.90  First, even prosecutors have long acknowledged that eye-
witness testimony is highly suspect and frequently leads to false con-
victions.91  Second, the eyewitnesses in this case actually contradicted 
 86  2005 WI App 176, ¶ 1, 285 Wis. 2d 804, ¶ 1, 701 N.W.2d 652, ¶ 1. 
 87 Id. at ¶¶ 13–17. 
 88 Id. at ¶¶ 8–13. 
 89 Id. at ¶ 9. 
 90 Id. at ¶ 14. 
 91 The Wisconsin Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification, co-
authored by the Office of the Attorney General and the Wisconsin Department of 
Justice, states that “[r]esearch and nationwide experience have demonstrated that 
eyewitness evidence can be a particularly fragile type of evidence, and that eyewit-
nesses can be mistaken” and “can make significant identification errors . . . .” OFFICE 
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each other and had serious credibility issues.  Of the three eyewit-
nesses, one testified that the perpetrator’s description did not match 
that of the defendant.92  Another who did identify the defendant ad-
mitted to receiving substantial consideration from the district attor-
ney’s office, on five of his own pending cases, in exchange for his tes-
timony.93  At least one of the witnesses who identified the defendant 
was also a convicted criminal and was impeached with the prior con-
victions.94
Given the highly speculative and contradictory nature of the evi-
dence, it is difficult to imagine how the prosecutor’s misconduct 
could not have harmed the defendant.  Additionally, given the nu-
merous violations that occurred from the beginning of the trial 
through closing arguments, it is difficult to imagine how the prosecu-
tor could have done any more to violate the defendant’s Due Process 
right to a fair trial.  In fact, the court stated that: 
Disparaging remarks directed at defense counsel are reprehensi-
ble.  Such remarks can prejudice the defendant by directing the 
jury’s attention away from the legal issues or by inducing the jury 
to give greater weight to the government’s view of the case.  Dis-
paraging remarks that suggest that defense counsel has lied to or 
withheld information from the jury can further prejudice the de-
fendant by causing the jury to believe that the defense’s charac-
terization of the evidence should not be trusted and, therefore, 
that a finding of not guilty would be in conflict with the true facts 
of the case.  This kind of statement, if inflammatory in nature, 
might also detract from the dignity of judicial proceedings.95
Despite this condemnation, the court, acting as “super-jury,”96 
weighed the evidence and somehow concluded that “it is not rea-
sonably likely that the prosecutor’s misconduct affected the outcome 
of the trial, precluded a fair trial or prejudiced [the defendant].”97  
The court then sternly warned that “such conduct nevertheless re-
flects very poorly on the office of the district attorney . . . and de-
means the trial process.  At some point in the future, this type of 
OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. & THE WIS. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, WISCONSIN MODEL POLICY & 
PROCEDURE FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 2 (2005). 
 92 Jackson, 2005 WI App 176, at ¶ 15. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at ¶ 9 n.2 (citing U.S. v. Xiong, 262 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 96 Gershman, supra note 4, at 425. 
 97 Id. at ¶ 16. 
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conduct may very well be grounds for a determination of prejudice 
and reversal of a conviction.”98
This case is a perfect illustration of the complete ineffectiveness 
of judicial discretion in ensuring a defendant’s Due Process right to a 
fair trial.  Unfortunately, there is nothing unique about this holding; 
judges routinely permit this level of misconduct in other appellate 
districts within the state, as well as in other states and in the federal 
system.99  What is enlightening, however, is a continued analysis of 
case law within this appellate district, especially in view of the court’s 
warning that this type of behavior will not be tolerated in the future. 
(b)     State v. Mayo: Saved by the Jury Instruction 
A short time after Jackson, this same court again had the oppor-
tunity to review a case of prosecutorial misconduct.  In State v. Mayo100 
the very same prosecutor’s office as in Jackson committed nearly iden-
tical prosecutorial misconduct, which again included improper clos-
ing argument.  The prosecutor’s comments to the jury mirrored 
those of the prosecutor in Jackson: “[T]he defense attorney here . . . 
has one job.  His job is to get his client off the hook.  That’s his only 
job here, not to see justice done but to see that his client is acquitted, 
and he’s fighting hard for his client.”101
The prosecutor was seemingly undeterred by the court’s recent 
but apparently empty warning that “[a]t some point in the future, 
this type of conduct may very well be grounds for a determination of 
prejudice and reversal of a conviction.”102  Consequently, the same 
prosecutor’s office was again rewarded for ignoring the ethical rules 
and the rules of trial practice.  In Mayo, instead of enforcing its stern 
warning enunciated in Jackson, the court pointed to a jury instruction 
given by the trial court that stated “closing arguments do not consti-
tute evidence.”103  The court concluded that “juries are presumed to 
follow the instructions given to them,”104 and consequently found the 
misconduct to be harmless. 
The court’s reasoning, however, is seriously flawed.  First, the 
jury instruction referred to by the court was not a curative instruction 
tailored to the specific misconduct, but rather was an instruction that 
 98 Id. at ¶ 17. 
 99 See, e.g., supra notes 73–74. 
 100 2006 WI App 78, ¶ 5 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 276, ¶ 5, 713 N.W.2d 191, ¶ 5. 
 101 Id. at ¶ 4. 
 102 Jackson, 2005 WI App 176 at ¶ 17. 
 103 Mayo, 2006 WI App 78, at ¶ 5. 
 104 Id. 
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is “given in every case.”105  By the court’s reasoning, then, the prose-
cutor may commit misconduct in closing arguments in every case, be-
cause the jury has been instructed that closing arguments are not evi-
dence. 
Second, the jury instruction is irrelevant.  The issue was not the 
introduction of improper evidence, but rather the impact of improper 
argument.  The court’s failure to recognize this distinction proves its 
inability and unwillingness to protect defendants’ rights.  Instead, the 
court merely repeated its same empty warning that “the remarks are 
nevertheless deserving of condemnation. . . .  [T]he remarks dispar-
aged defense counsel and cast defense counsel, an equal participant 
in the proceeding, in a pejorative light.”106  Furthermore, the court 
stated that “[t]he remarks reflect poorly on the prosecutor [and] 
[t]he remarks cannot be excused, as the State would have us do.”107
Not only has the court shown its unwillingness to exercise its dis-
cretion in such a way as to protect constitutional rights, but it has also 
hypocritically uttered the same useless words that have already been 
ignored by the very same prosecutor’s office.  While this condemna-
tion may satisfy the court, it only gives the prosecutor’s office more 
incentive to continue its misconduct in the future.108  More impor-
tantly, it does nothing for the defendant whose rights have just been 
violated by the prosecutor under the court’s wandering eye. 
(c)     State v. Graham: The “Failure to Object” 
When this particular court grows tired, or possibly embarrassed, 
of issuing its boiler-plate warning, it will find ways to side-step the is-
sue of prosecutorial misconduct altogether.  For example, in State v. 
Graham109 the defendant appealed his conviction based on improper 
questions and argument by the prosecutor.  One of the key issues at 
trial was Graham’s whereabouts on the date of his alleged “other 
act”110 that was introduced as evidence.111  This “other act” was very 
similar to the crime with which he was charged and, as the court ac-
 105 See WIS. J.I. CRIMINAL 1, 160 (1999). 
 106 Mayo, 2006 WI App 78, at ¶ 12. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 123 (citing People v. Congious, No. B0202709 
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (“[I]t is disheartening, to say the least, to learn that she 
takes ‘pride’ in our admonitions, apparently because we did not reverse the judg-
ment rendered.”)). 
 109 2006 WI App 214, ¶ 1, 287 Wis. 2d 509, ¶ 1, 704 N.W.2d 425, ¶ 1.  
 110 See WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2) (2003–04) (permitting, under certain circumstances, 
the admission into evidence of “other crimes, wrongs or acts”). 
 111 Graham, 2006 WI App 214, at ¶¶ 4, 5. 
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knowledged, was “highly probative . . . of Graham’s identity as the of-
fender in this case.”112
Graham presented evidence, through a witness’s testimony and 
through his own testimony, that he was at the Luxor Hotel in Las Ve-
gas at the time of the alleged “other act.”113  On cross-examination of 
Graham’s witness, the prosecutor attempted to undermine Graham’s 
evidence by stating that “[w]e checked with the Luxor, and—.”114  De-
fense counsel immediately interrupted and objected to this as “testi-
mony” by the prosecutor, but the trial court refused to rule on the 
objection and allowed the prosecutor to continue along this path.115
Next, Graham himself testified that he was at the Luxor at the 
time of the alleged “other act,” and on cross-examination the prose-
cutor asked twice: “[y]ou don’t have any explanation as to why the 
Luxor would have no record of your ever staying at the Luxor Ho-
tel?”116  Defense counsel objected to both questions as providing 
prosecutorial “testimony,” but was overruled both times.117  During 
closing argument, having succeeded with this testimonial tactic in 
cross-examination, the prosecutor further bolstered his case by telling 
the jury that “I was able to have members of my staff telephone the 
Luxor.”118
On appeal, the court acknowledged that the transcript was “de-
void of any factual predicate for the prosecutor’s questions . . . re-
garding the records of the Luxor.”119  The court found that the prose-
cutor had clearly made assertions that were impossible for the 
defendant to cross-examine, and also argued facts not in evidence in 
his closing argument.120  However, instead of following through on its 
warning that such conduct “may very well be grounds for a determi-
nation of prejudice and reversal of a conviction,”121 the court insu-
lated the prosecutor from responsibility and actually cast the blame, 
in part, on defense counsel. 
 112 Id. at ¶ 27. 
 113 Id. at ¶ 6. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id.  Defense counsel stated: “Judge, I object.  This is testimony.  He needs to 
call a witness.”  Id. 
 116 Graham, 2006 WI App 214, at ¶ 9. 
 117 Id.  Defense counsel “objected, stating ‘Judge, he [the prosecutor] can’t testify 
to these things.’”  Id. 
 118 Id. at ¶ 11. 
 119 Id. at ¶ 16. 
 120 Id. at ¶¶ 16–19. 
 121 Jackson, 2005 WI App 176, at ¶ 17. 
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With regard to Graham’s witness, it was undisputed that defense 
counsel objected the instant the prosecutor began to “testify” during 
the state’s cross-examination, and the trial court refused to rule on 
the objection.122  The appellate court held, however, that defense 
counsel’s failure to renew the objection upon completion of the 
question that contained the prosecutorial “testimony” constituted a 
“failure to object.”123
This holding not only avoids the real issue but is also contrary to 
well-established trial practice.124  First, defense counsel objected im-
mediately upon hearing the improper conduct.125  Second, defense 
counsel is not required to repeat the same objection, particularly in 
such a short period of time, when the court fails to rule on an objec-
tion.126  Rather, “[i]f there is no ruling, counsel should consider the 
objection overruled.”127
With regard to Graham’s own testimony, where the trial court 
did explicitly overrule the identical objection, the appellate court ac-
knowledged the judicial error, but simply played “super-jury” by 
weighing the evidence and finding that the prosecutor’s misconduct 
was harmless.128  This finding was based on the other evidence pre-
sented at trial against the defendant, in particular, the “other acts” 
evidence which was “highly probative . . . of Graham’s identity.”129  
What the court chooses to ignore, however, is that the prosecutor’s 
misconduct was employed specifically to prove that the defendant 
committed the “other act”—the very piece of evidence on which the 
court relies to negate the impact of the misconduct. 
(d)     State v. Smith: Moving for Mistrial 
In the last of a string of cases, and shortly after Graham, this same 
appellate court again had the opportunity to address prosecutorial 
misconduct in State v. Smith.130  In Smith, the defendant objected to 
improper closing arguments by the prosecutor but the trial court 
 122 Graham, 2006 WI App 214, at ¶ 6. 
 123 Id. at ¶ 22 (“Thus, the substance of the information, albeit improper, was 
known to the jury by virtue of Graham’s failure to object.”). 
 124 R. GEORGE BURNETT, et al., WISCONSIN TRIAL PRACTICE § 6, at 16 (1st ed. Supp. 
2001). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Graham, 2006 WI App 214, at ¶ 29. 
 129 Id. at ¶ 27. 
 130 No. 2005AP1617-CR (Wis. Ct. App. May 17, 2006) (on file with author). 
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overruled each and every objection.131  These improper arguments 
included offering facts not testified to by witnesses, shifting the bur-
den of proof to the defendant, and commenting on defense counsel’s 
pre-trial strategy as evidence of the defendant’s guilt.132
Instead of taking the opportunity to review the claim of prosecu-
torial misconduct, the appellate court again side-stepped the issue al-
together and again used defense counsel as the reason for not ad-
dressing the underlying problem.  This time, the court summarily 
dismissed the defendant’s appeal,133 holding that the issue was waived 
because defense counsel failed to move for a mistrial.134
It is true, and this very appellate court has held, that when a de-
fendant objects to prosecutorial misconduct, and the court sustains 
the objection and issues a curative instruction, the defendant’s failure 
to move for a mistrial must be construed as his choice to take the case 
to verdict rather than start over with a new trial.135  The problem with 
the appellate court’s application of this rule in Smith, however, is that 
in Smith, each and every one of defense counsel’s objections had 
been overruled by the trial court.136
The appellate court’s holding, therefore, violates the incredibly 
basic concept that a mistrial, like a curative instruction, is a remedy.  
In order to request a remedy, there must be a wrong as evidenced by 
a sustained objection.  It is contrary to common logic to require the 
defendant to request a remedy—whether in the form of a curative in-
struction, a mistrial, a special rebuttal argument, or some other rem-
edy—when the trial court has just found that no wrong has occurred 
and has overruled the defendant’s objection.  This concept is so fun-
damental, both commentators and other state courts, including Cali-
fornia, agree that: 
If the trial court overrules the objection, no further step should 
be required of defense counsel in terms of either the motion for 
mistrial or request for specific admonition to disregard precisely 
because the trial court has ruled that no misconduct has oc-
 131 Id. at 2. 
 132 Id. at 1. 
 133 See WIS. STAT. § 809.21 (2003–04); Smith, No. 2005AP1617-CR, at 1. 
 134 Smith, No. 2005AP1617-CR, at 2. 
 135 State v. Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, ¶ 30, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 483, ¶ 30, 
718 N.W.2d 269, ¶ 30 (“Rockette made no motion for mistrial after the court ad-
dressed the objections.  All we can assume is that Rockette was satisfied with the 
court’s ruling and curative measure, and that he had no further objections.  Rockette 
took his chances with the jury.”). 
 136 Smith, No. 2005AP1617-CR, at 2. 
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curred.  Consequently, curative action could hardly be rationally con-
templated by a court that has rejected the defense challenge.137
[T]he absence of a request for a curative admonition does not 
forfeit the issue for appeal if the court immediately overrules an 
objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct and as a consequence 
the defendant has no opportunity to make such a request.138  
 Further, in Smith, the mistrial would have to be requested “im-
mediately after the claimed source of error, especially [because] the 
error [was] the misconduct of an attorney.”139  Defense counsel, 
therefore, would have to move for the mistrial immediately after the 
trial court overruled the objection, thereby risking admonition by the 
court for what would have been an absurd request, and potentially 
diminishing defense counsel’s credibility in the eyes of the jury.140
These cases, which are not only from the same state but also 
from the same appellate court within the state, illustrate the courts’ 
inability to protect defendants’ constitutional rights.  Additionally, 
these cases show that the courts’ ineffectiveness is not the result of a 
failed, but good faith effort.  Instead, the ineffectiveness stems from 
bad faith rulings and “judicial hypocrisy” in condemning prosecutors 
for their harmful misconduct in one breath, and then approving and 
even encouraging the very same misconduct in the next.  Finally, and 
perhaps most harmfully, the absurd rulings in Graham and Smith also 
highlight the lengths to which the courts will go to avoid the underly-
ing issues of prosecutorial misconduct and the abuse of trial court 
discretion in dealing with the misconduct. 
3. The Courts’ Refusal to Bar Retrial 
Another problem with the application of judicial discretion is 
that, in the rare case that a mistrial is actually granted or a conviction 
is reversed, courts almost universally allow the prosecution to retry 
the defendant, often with a stronger, trial-tested case the second time 
around. 
 137 Sullivan, supra note 29, at 256 (emphasis added). 
 138 People v. Najera, No. E034255, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 5712, at *16 (Cal. Ct. 
App. June 16, 2004) (citing People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 820–21 (Cal. 1998)) (em-
phasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
 139 BURNETT et. al., supra note 124, at 22. 
 140 Failure to immediately move for the mistrial after the overruled objection 
would likely have given the appellate court another reason to summarily dismiss the 
defendant’s claim.  The court could then have held that anything other than an im-
mediate motion for mistrial would have denied the trial court the opportunity to at-
tempt to cure the misconduct by less severe means.  See id. 
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Under Oregon v. Kennedy,141 the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that the defendants’ double jeopardy protections only ex-
tend to cases where the prosecutor’s misconduct was committed “in 
order to goad the [defendant] into requesting a mistrial.”142  There-
fore, upon a defendant’s motion to dismiss a second prosecution, the 
court must again exercise its discretion and make a finding of fact.  
This time, the court must make the distinction between whether the 
prosecutor committed the misconduct “in order to goad the [defen-
dant] into requesting a mistrial,” or rather merely to engage in “har-
assment or overreaching.”143
Under Kennedy, therefore, if the prosecutor merely intended to 
harass the defendant, overreach, or obtain a conviction by improper 
means, the prosecutor is rewarded by being able to retry the defen-
dant in a second trial or even in subsequent trials.  The problem for 
the defendant is as obvious as it is ridiculous.  “It is almost inconceiv-
able that a defendant could prove that the prosecutor’s deliberate 
misconduct was motivated by an intent to provoke a mistrial instead 
of an intent simply to prejudice the defendant.”144  Not surprisingly, 
few courts have actually barred retrial under this incredible stan-
dard.145
IV.     REMOVING JUDICIAL DISCRETION FROM THE FRAMEWORK 
A. Proposed Rule and Rationale 
The solution to this problem is that once the trial court finds 
that the prosecutor committed misconduct, judicial discretion must 
be eliminated in determining the proper remedy.  If the defendant 
requests a mistrial based on the misconduct, the mistrial should be 
granted regardless of the judge’s opinion about whether the defen-
dant would be found guilty had the misconduct not occurred.146
This proposed rule will ensure a fair trial, free of prosecutorial 
abuse and manipulation of the trial process.  This fairness is ensured 
 141 456 U.S. 667 (1982). 
 142 Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)). 
 143 Id. at 675. 
 144 Id. at 688 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
 145 See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 894–95. 
 146 See Duffy, supra note 81, at 1360 (arguing for a per-se reversible error rule in 
cases of religious arguments at sentencing hearings in capital cases); see also Tobin, 
supra note 16, at 237 (arguing for automatic reversal upon a finding of prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing arguments); see also White, supra note 36, at 1157–68 (arguing 
for a per-se reversal rule in capital cases not only to protect rights but also to regulate 
prosecutorial conduct). 
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because the jury, not the judge, will be weighing the evidence and 
making findings of fact.147  Furthermore, in cases where a prosecutor 
believes he has a strong case, the rule will discourage misconduct be-
cause the prosecutor will not wish to risk a mistrial when he believes 
he will likely win a conviction.148
Second, upon declaration of a mistrial, the state should be 
barred from retrying the defendant upon a finding that the prosecu-
tor’s misconduct was intentional.  This should not require a finding 
that the prosecutor intended to “goad the defendant into seeking a 
mistrial,”149 but rather merely that he intended the conduct itself, and 
knew or should have known that the conduct was improper.150  This 
finding would be made on an objective basis, and would necessarily 
include all violations of well-established trial rules and procedures. 
This aspect of the proposed rule would offer legitimate, rather 
than illusory, double jeopardy protection by prohibiting successive 
prosecutions for the same allegations.  Furthermore, in cases where a 
prosecutor believes he has a weak case, this rule will discourage mis-
conduct because the prosecutor would rather take his chance with 
the jury’s verdict than guarantee a mistrial and be barred from re-
prosecuting the defendant.151
B. The Confrontation Clause Analogy 
The rule proposed in this Article for dealing with prosecutorial 
misconduct is not unique in the larger realm of constitutional juris-
prudence.  When the use of judicial discretion fails to protect consti-
tutional rights, that judicial discretion has been taken away to ensure 
that those rights are in fact protected.  This principle has most re-
 147 Gernon, supra note 75, at 252 (discussing Kansas case law and the view “that it 
is problematic to allow appellate judges to draw conclusions as to ‘a defendant’s guilt 
based on [the judge’s] own view[] of the weight and credibility of the evidence.’”) 
(quoting Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 79, 127 (1988)). 
 148 See Gershman, supra note 4, at 431. 
 149 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982) (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 
424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)). 
 150 Numerous states have already abandoned the illusory double jeopardy protec-
tion of Oregon v. Kennedy, and have instead adopted more sensible tests offering real-
istic double jeopardy protection to defendants.  See, e.g., State v. Breit, 1996-NMSC-
67, ¶ 32, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792 (requiring that the prosecutor act in “willful 
disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal”); see also State v. Kennedy, 666 
P.2d 1316, 1326 (Or. 1983) (requiring only that the prosecutor “intends or is indif-
ferent to the resulting mistrial or reversal”); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 
A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992) (requiring that the prosecutor intended to “prejudice the 
defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial”). 
 151 See Gershman, supra note 4, at 431. 
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cently been expounded in Crawford v. Washington,152 where the Su-
preme Court of the United States addressed the admission of hearsay 
evidence and the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confronta-
tion. 
In Crawford, the Court revisited the decades-old practice of allow-
ing hearsay evidence to be introduced at trial, against a defendant, 
without affording him the opportunity to cross-examine the decla-
rant.153  Pre-Crawford, the prosecutor was allowed to introduce such 
hearsay, despite the plain language of the Confrontation Clause, pro-
vided the trial judge first found the hearsay to be “reliable.”154  Reli-
ability was determined through the use of a judicial balancing test by 
weighing the facts and circumstances surrounding the hearsay state-
ment.155
The problem with this approach was that the use of judicial dis-
cretion failed miserably in protecting the defendant from even the 
most flagrant violations of the Confrontation Clause.156  Judges would 
consistently admit into evidence even the most harmful and unreli-
able hearsay that had the “unique potential for prosecutorial 
abuse.”157  For example, courts would routinely find to be reliable, 
and consequently admissible, hearsay statements of third parties that 
implicated the defendant but were obtained through police interro-
gations of those third parties.  Although this type of ex parte govern-
ment interrogation was the “principal evil”158 at which the Confronta-
tion Clause was directed, the use of judicial discretion served to water 
down the Clause to the point where it provided no protection what-
soever.159
After decades of watching the judges abuse their discretion, the 
Supreme Court finally ruled that “[a]dmitting statements deemed re-
liable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confronta-
tion.”160  Furthermore, allowing judicial discretion to replace “cate-
gorical constitutional guarantees”161 amounts to a denial of 
 152 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 153 See id. at 38. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See id. at 41. 
 156 See id. at 63–64. 
 157 Id. at 56. 
 158 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
 159 See id. at 65 (“To add insult to injury, some of the courts that admit untested 
testimonial statements find reliability in the very factors that make the statements tes-
timonial.”). 
 160 Id. at 61. 
 161 Id. at 67. 
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constitutional rights.162  “Vague standards are manipulable,”163 and 
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is [deemed reli-
able by a judge] is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defen-
dant is obviously guilty.”164
The Crawford Court therefore held that with regard to untested, 
testimonial hearsay offered by the state against a defendant, the hear-
say must be, or must have been at a previous time, subjected to cross-
examination by the defendant.165  Without the opportunity for actual 
cross-examination, the hearsay must be excluded from evidence.166
The pre-Crawford hearsay problem described above directly par-
allels today’s prosecutorial misconduct problem, and so too should 
the solutions.167  First, whether by admitting untested, testimonial 
hearsay against a defendant, or by allowing a prosecutor to commit 
repeated acts of misconduct throughout trial, courts are violating de-
fendants’ constitutional rights.  Furthermore, the precise constitu-
tional right being violated is often the same. 
For example, many forms of prosecutorial misconduct violate 
not only the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to a fair trial, 
but also the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation specifically ad-
dressed in Crawford.  “A prosecutor’s use of non-evidence (such as as-
sertions in an opening statement or, under some circumstances, 
questions) to sway a jury, can deny a defendant his or her right to 
confrontation when those assertions are not backed by evidence pro-
duced at trial.”168  It does not matter that the prosecutor’s statements 
are “not technically testimony.”169  The reality is that the statements 
are “the equivalent in the jury’s eyes, thus triggering the right to con-
front.”170
Second, in both the pre-Crawford hearsay problem as well as to-
day’s prosecutorial misconduct problem, the use of judicial discretion 
is a fundamentally flawed concept in that judges are allowed to usurp 
the role of the jury.  In the pre-Crawford setting, judges were allowed 
 162 See id. at 67. 
 163 Id. at 68. 
 164 Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 62. 
 165 Id. at 61. 
 166 Id. at 68. 
 167 Cross-Amendment analogies are not uncommon.  See, e.g., United States v. Var-
gas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978) (drawing an analogy between Fifth and Eight 
Amendments as affected by prosecutorial misconduct). 
 168 State v. Bannister, 2006 WI App 136, ¶ 20, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 447, ¶ 20, 
720 N.W.2d 498, ¶ 20 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–20 (1965)). 
 169 Id. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–20 (1965)). 
 170 Id. at 21–22 (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418–20 (1965)). 
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to determine the reliability, and consequently admissibility, of hear-
say evidence.171  In cases of prosecutorial misconduct, judges go even 
further and act as “super-jury” to determine the guilt of the defen-
dant, and consequently use this finding to deny the defendant his 
right to a trial free of prosecutorial abuse.172
This use of judicial discretion is fundamentally flawed because 
our concept of justice depends not only on the final outcome—e.g., 
whether the hearsay is reliable or whether the defendant is guilty—
but also on the process used to determine that outcome.  Because the 
way in which we reach the result is just as important as the result it-
self, it is unacceptable to let the judge usurp the jury’s role.  This is 
true whether the judge is determining the reliability of hearsay, 
thereby compromising confrontation rights, or determining a defen-
dant’s guilt, which will in turn be used to condone the prosecutorial 
misconduct and compromise the right to a fair trial. 
For example, with regard to the pre-Crawford rule of admitting 
testimonial hearsay without cross-examination, the Court stated: 
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally 
at odds with the right of confrontation.  To be sure, the Clause’s 
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a proce-
dural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.  The Clause thus 
reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evi-
dence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about 
how reliability can best be determined.173
Likewise, permitting prosecutorial misconduct to stand because 
a judge has independently determined the defendant’s guilt poses 
the identical problem: 
Due process is thus a set of fair procedures designed to determine 
truth in a manner consistent with the process goals of the system.  
Due process requires not only that criminal proceedings reach a 
correct outcome—that justice be done—but also that the correct 
outcome be reached only through the use of fundamentally fair 
procedures.174  “[T]he question is not whether guilt may be spelt 
out of a record, but whether guilt has been found by a jury ac-
 171 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 172 Gershman, supra note 4, at 425. 
 173 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (emphasis added). 
 174 Fisher, supra note 49, at 1300 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 
(1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting)). 
CICCHINIFINAL 1/15/2007  12:08:01 PM 
362 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:335 
 
cording to the procedure and standards appropriate for criminal 
trials.”175
Third, prosecutorial misconduct is equally, if not more, harmful 
than Confrontation Clause violations.  Pre-Crawford, when judges de-
termined the reliability, and consequently the admissibility, of hear-
say evidence, they were guarding against only the possibility of prose-
cutorial abuse in that the government may have influenced the 
reliability of the hearsay statement.176  In the case of prosecutorial 
misconduct at trial, however, prosecutorial abuse is very present and 
real, rather than merely a possibility, and has a definite impact on the 
jury’s decision-making process and consequently on the defendant’s 
rights.177
Additionally, with regard to judicially determined reliability of 
hearsay, the Court in Crawford stated that “[w]e have no doubt that 
the courts below were acting in utmost good faith when they found 
reliability.”178  In cases of prosecutorial misconduct, however, courts 
have routinely shown a lack of good faith.  Instead, courts have acted 
hypocritically by repeating the same, empty warning to prosecutors, 
and have even gone so far as to divert blame to defense counsel while 
insulating prosecutors and trial judges from responsibility. 
Fourth, after decades of use, both the pre-Crawford rule for ad-
mitting hearsay evidence, as well as today’s rule for dealing with 
prosecutorial misconduct have proven completely ineffective in their 
application.  In cases of determining the reliability of hearsay, the 
Court stated that the most serious problem with the pre-Crawford ju-
dicial discretion approach was “its demonstrated capacity to admit 
core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly 
meant to exclude.”179
Likewise, with regard to using judicial discretion in cases of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the courts have continually permitted, and 
 175 Gershman, supra note 4, at 426 (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 
607, 614 (1946) (emphasis added)). 
 176 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 (“Involvement of government officers in the produc-
tion of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial 
abuse . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 177 See Tobin, supra note 16, at 221 (citing empirical studies of the effects on jurors 
of improper argument and the failure of so-called curative instructions to cure the 
problem). 
 178 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67. 
 179 Id. at 63. 
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in fact encouraged, even the most egregious misconduct that clearly 
violates the Due Process right to a fair trial.180
Fifth and finally, the use of judicial discretion under the pre-
Crawford rule for admitting hearsay, as well as under today’s rule for 
dealing with prosecutorial misconduct, produces a bizarre and unac-
ceptable result.  In Crawford, the Court acknowledged that 
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reli-
able [via a judicial determination] is akin to dispensing with jury trial 
because a defendant is obviously guilty.”181
Likewise, with regard to prosecutorial misconduct, under the 
current rule the defendant is not entitled to a trial free of prosecuto-
rial abuse as long as the judge believes the defendant would be found 
guilty even without the misconduct.  Essentially, “if [a defendant] is 
obviously guilty as charged, he has no fundamental right to be tried 
fairly.”182
In both situations, just as the problems parallel one another, so 
too should the solutions.  The use of judicial discretion must be 
eliminated, and replaced with what the Framers of the Constitution 
intended: a categorical constitutional guarantee to a fair trial in 
which the jury, not the judge, determines the weight and credibility 
of the evidence and the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
V. CRITIC’S CORNER: ANTICIPATING THE OPPOSING ARGUMENTS 
A. The Jury Instruction as a Curative Measure 
Courts routinely permit prosecutorial misconduct, especially in 
closing argument, by relying on the jury instruction as a curative 
measure.  Most commonly, this is nothing more than an instruction 
that closing arguments are not evidence, which is supposed to cure 
the harm caused by the prosecutor’s highly prejudicial argument.183
This supposed attempt to cure the harm, which is actually noth-
ing more than encouragement for the misconduct, is incredibly 
 180 See, e.g., Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 123 (quoting People v. Congious, No. 
B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (“[I]t is disheartening, to say the least, to 
learn that she takes ‘pride’ in our admonitions, apparently because we did not re-
verse the judgment rendered.”). 
 181 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. 
 182 Gershman, supra note 4, at 426 (quoting Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of 
Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 486 (1959)). 
 183 See, e.g., State v. Mayo, 2006 WI App 78, ¶ 5, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 276, ¶ 5, 
713 N.W.2d 191, ¶ 5 (“[T]he jury was instructed that closing arguments do not con-
stitute evidence, and juries are presumed to follow the instructions given to them.”) 
(citing State v. Traux, 151 Wis. 2d 354, 362 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)). 
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flawed on several levels.  First, the curative instruction does nothing 
to address the problem.  It is true that improper argument is not evi-
dence, but it is also true that proper argument is not evidence.  There-
fore, the instruction, while true, is completely irrelevant.  The harm 
comes not from whether the improper arguments are evidence, but 
rather from their prejudicial effect on the jury. 
Second, the instruction is often read to the jury, as it should be, 
even in cases where the state makes a closing argument completely 
within the bounds of the law.184  By that logic, then, improper argu-
ment should be acceptable in every case because the jury has already 
been instructed that it is not evidence.  If that were so, rules govern-
ing closing argument should simply be eliminated, which would at 
least place defense counsel on a level playing field with the prosecu-
tor. 
Third, and most significantly, even if a special, tailored instruc-
tion were given to address the specific misconduct, it is likely that 
such an instruction will only draw more attention to prosecutor’s ar-
gument, thereby further harming, rather than helping, the defen-
dant.185  “‘Curative’ or ‘limiting’ instructions are more problematic 
because the instructions not only fail to cure prejudice, they generally 
emphasize the objectionable argument.”186
This counter-productive effect of the so-called curative instruc-
tion is not only intuitively obvious, but is also supported by psycho-
logical research187 and is recognized by many judges as well.  “The na-
ive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by 
instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated 
fiction.”188  “Indeed, the judge’s cautionary instruction may do more 
harm than good: It may emphasize the jury’s awareness of the cen-
 184 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 29, at 214 (discussing the standard jury instruction 
in Arkansas that “argument does not constitute evidence and the jury is instructed 
not to consider it as such . . .”); see also Mayo, 2006 WI App 78, at ¶ 5 (discussing the 
mandatory criminal jury instruction in Wisconsin that “closing arguments do not 
constitute evidence . . . ”). 
 185 See Tobin, supra note 16, at 221 (citing several empirical studies to support the 
proposition that curative instructions do more harm than good for the defendant). 
 186 Duffy, supra note 81, at 1354 (internal citations omitted). 
 187 Tobin, supra note 16, at 221 (citing several articles and scientific studies indi-
cating that jurors are unable to follow curative instructions). 
 188 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(internal citation omitted) (citing Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d 
Cir. 1948)). 
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sured remark—as in the story, by Mark Twain, of the boy told to 
stand in the corner and not think of a white elephant.”189
Interestingly, the very same judges that are quick to rely on the 
curative instruction in criminal cases implicitly admit its complete in-
effectiveness by their rulings in civil cases.  For example, Judge Frank 
observed, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Antonelli Fire-
works Co.,190 how his court members frequently reversed verdicts in 
civil cases where the plaintiff’s lawyer made improper comments, 
such as telling the jury that the defendant, from whom the plaintiff 
seeks money, is insured.191  Judge Frank was rightly critical of this 
double standard, and argued that if reversal “is to be invoked to pro-
tect the pocketbook of an insurance company, it should be invoked 
in [criminal cases] to protect natural persons from being sent to jail 
unjustly.”192
B. Bad Prosecutor: Prosecutorial Discipline in Disguise 
Those opposed to ensuring constitutional protections argue that 
rules such as the one proposed in this Article are nothing more than 
an improper means of disciplining prosecutors.193  The rule proposed 
in this Article, however, is not designed in any way to accomplish 
prosecutorial discipline.  Rather, its goal is to protect the fundamen-
tal rights of citizens accused of crimes, and to ensure “that the cir-
cumstances that gave rise to the misconduct won’t be repeated in 
other cases.”194
Implementing an effective system of prosecutorial discipline is, 
in itself, a noble goal.  Unfortunately, the legal profession has shown 
little if any interest in punishing prosecutors for misconduct.  “It is 
unclear why the electorate, the judiciary, and the legislature have 
taken such a ‘hands-off’ approach with the American prosecutor.”195  
Most likely, the answer is the political nature of judges and legislators.  
Due to the “lack of public outrage over prosecutorial misconduct,”196 
 189 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 656 (2nd Cir. 1946) 
(Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 190 See id. 
 191 See id. at 658. 
 192 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 193 See, e.g., Peter G. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 
77 WASH. U. L. Q. 713, 827 (1999). 
 194 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 959 (quoting United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 
1324 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 195 Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 464 (2001). 
 196 Id. at 465. 
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as well as the glamorization of the prosecutor in our society, it is little 
wonder why prosecutorial discipline is nearly non-existent. 
Prosecutors enforce the law against people accused of committing 
crimes—an unpopular group in a country with one of the most 
punitive approaches to crime in the world.  Because law enforce-
ment is such a high priority in this country and the victims of 
prosecutorial misconduct are so unpopular, the electorate, legis-
lature, and judiciary may be less concerned with fairness in the 
prosecutorial process.197
In any event, politically motivated or not, those with the power 
and authority to punish prosecutors are unwilling to do so.  As of 
1999, “one of the striking realities of the forty-five recent federal re-
versals is that despite findings of intentional misconduct and exten-
sive criticism of prosecutors’ conduct, not one court ordered a prose-
cutor disciplined or referred a prosecutor for discipline.”198  This 
sends the clear message that the courts have no intention of punish-
ing or disciplining the offending prosecutors, despite the huge stakes 
that individual citizens face in the criminal process.  As one commen-
tator wrote, at least with regard to prosecutorial misconduct by with-
holding evidence, under the current system: 
[T]he prudent prosecutor is unconcerned about an ethical viola-
tion.  Even assuming the prosecutor is aware of his duty to dis-
close favorable evidence under the professional codes . . . he has 
never heard of a prosecutor being disciplined for his exercise of 
discretion in withholding evidence. . . .  The message sent is that, 
although it is a rule on the books, the disciplinary authorities do 
not believe its violation worthy of condemnation.199
Another reason that so few ethical violations are reported to dis-
ciplinary bodies is that such a report by the trial court would “ring 
hollow if curative action had not been taken at trial.”200  Yet another 
possible reason may again be political in nature.  “[A]s a governmen-
tal figure of enormous power and prestige, the prosecutor is a person 
who professional bar organizations would not wish to alienate,” par-
ticularly “in today’s anti-crime climate.”201
While punishing ethical violations may be a worthy goal, the cur-
rent environment in which we operate makes any such attempt fu-
 197 Id. at 464 (footnote omitted). 
 198 Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 169–70. 
 199 Hoeffel, supra note 20, at 1146–47 (footnotes omitted). 
 200 Sullivan, supra note 29, at 253. 
 201 Gershman, supra note 4, at 445. 
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tile.202  Therefore, rather than pleading with prosecutors to abide by 
ethical rules,203 a better approach is simply to eliminate any advantage 
gained by the misconduct. 
Under the existing framework, if a prosecutor has a strong case, 
the misconduct will only make it stronger.204  There is virtually no risk 
of reversal because the trial court and reviewing court will simply find 
that, given the strength of the State’s case, the defendant would have 
been found guilty even without the misconduct, and therefore deny-
ing him a new trial will not prejudice him.  If, on the other hand, the 
prosecutor has a weak case and faces a likely acquittal, the miscon-
duct will once again help the case.  In this situation, the misconduct 
increases the chance of conviction or, even in the rare case of mistrial 
or reversal, gives the prosecutor a chance at a new trial.205
In either of the above scenarios, the prosecutor has tremendous 
incentive to commit misconduct.  However, if the advantages gained 
by prosecutorial misconduct are removed, as they would be under the 
rule proposed in this Article, there would be no incentive for prose-
cutors to commit misconduct in the first place.  This would thereby 
reduce or even eliminate the need for disciplinary action. 
C. A Word on Judicial Costs and Efficiency 
Even the most flagrant cases of prosecutorial misconduct typi-
cally result in judicial tolerance, if not judicial encouragement, at the 
trial level, followed by affirmation at the appellate level.  Proponents 
of this status quo frequently justify their position by pointing to the 
perceived costs of conducting a second, fair trial, free of the miscon-
duct.  Even some of those who are highly critical of prosecutorial 
misconduct seem to concede that the current, tolerant approach to 
dealing with prosecutorial misconduct “saves judicial resources.”206
This cost and efficiency argument is flawed in several respects.  
First, it overstates the true cost of implementing a less tolerant ap-
proach to dealing with misconduct.  For example, under a rule like 
the one proposed in this Article, not every defendant in every case 
 202 See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Zealous Advocacy in a Time of Uncertainty: Understand-
ing Lawyers’ Ethics: Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 
8 D.C. L. REV. 275 (2004). 
 203 See, e.g., Spiegelman, supra note 60, at 123 (citing People v. Congious, No. 
B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987) (After multiple cases of misconduct by the 
same prosecutor, the court pleaded: “We most earnestly urge counsel to reconsider 
her approach . . . .”). 
 204 See Gershman, supra note 4, at 431. 
 205 See id. 
 206 See id. 
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would request a mistrial in cases of prosecutorial misconduct.  In fact, 
prosecutors often commit misconduct because they realize that the 
defendant has a strong case.207  Under these circumstances, defense 
counsel will often want to proceed to verdict rather than risk a sec-
ond trial.  “[I]f grounds exist for a mistrial but it appears that the 
party harmed by the error will nonetheless prevail, a motion for mis-
trial could be a costly error.”208
Second, the cost and efficiency argument also understates, or 
even ignores, the immense costs currently being incurred under the 
existing three-step framework for dealing with misconduct.  With the 
great number of cases currently being appealed for misconduct, the 
costs of attorneys, judges, transcripts, and other legal expenditures 
are exorbitant, but usually unaccounted for in the calculation.  Fur-
thermore, until the behavior is curtailed, society will continue to bear 
these costs. 
Third, the current calculus of the cost and efficiency argument 
often ignores the deterrent effect of alternative, stricter approaches 
to dealing with misconduct.209  By failing to account for the inevitable 
reduction in prosecutorial misconduct and related appeals, the ex-
pected litigation costs of the alternative methods are overstated. 
Fourth and finally, the cost and efficiency argument ignores 
many costs associated with the current system because certain costs 
are, although very real, quite difficult to quantify.  For example: 
[E]ven on its own terms, the proposed calculus in the instance of 
prosecutorial misconduct falls short.  What cost does corroded in-
tegrity in law enforcement’s preeminent office exact vis-à-vis the 
moral authority and ultimate viability of the criminal justice sys-
tem?  What message is transmitted in a society which is unwilling 
to enforce limits on prosecutor conduct otherwise beyond the 
reach of the law?210
While the very nature of this type of cost puts it beyond the 
scope of quantification, it is the significance and impact of this type 
of cost that renders a cost-benefit analysis highly ineffective, and 
largely irrelevant, when addressing the issue of prosecutorial miscon-
duct.211
 207 See id. 
 208 R. GEORGE BURNETT, WISCONSIN TRIAL PRACTICE § 8, at 22 (1st ed. Supp. 2001). 
 209 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 49, at 1322 (addressing the goal of “[d]eterring the 
[p]rosecutor”). 
 210 Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 961. 
 211 See id. 
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VI.     CONCLUSION 
Prosecutorial misconduct is wide-spread and has infected every 
aspect of the criminal trial.  The current legal framework for dealing 
with misconduct at trial relies exclusively on the use of judicial discre-
tion to determine the proper remedy, if any, for the misconduct.  Es-
sentially, if the trial court, and later the appellate court, believes that 
the defendant was guilty as charged, this belief is in turn used to hold 
that the prosecutorial misconduct could not, or did not, affect the 
jury’s verdict of guilt.  The misconduct is therefore allowed to stand, 
and the defendant is denied, among other constitutional rights, his 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to a fair trial.  Addition-
ally, the general societal harm, including the damage to the integrity 
of the criminal justice system, is immense but immeasurable. 
The current system is fundamentally flawed on the most basic 
level in that it allows the judge to usurp the role of the jury, weigh the 
evidence and make findings of guilt.  In addition to its fundamental 
flaw, the current system, which relies exclusively on judicial discre-
tion, has proven to be highly ineffective in its application.  In fact, the 
trial and appellate courts have not only tolerated prosecutorial mis-
conduct, but have actually encouraged it by issuing empty, repetitive 
warnings to prosecutors that the courts are unwilling to enforce.  
Even worse, courts will often go to extraordinary lengths, including 
diverting blame to defense counsel, to avoid dealing with the underly-
ing misconduct.  The result is that prosecutorial misconduct, even in 
its most flagrant forms, continues to flourish. 
The solution to the problem is to eliminate the use of judicial 
discretion from the current framework of dealing with trial miscon-
duct.  Instead, upon a finding of misconduct, if the defendant re-
quests a remedy of mistrial, a mistrial should be granted regardless of 
whether the trial court believes that the defendant would be found 
guilty even absent the misconduct.  Furthermore, in cases of inten-
tional misconduct—i.e., the prosecutor intended to commit the act 
that formed the basis of the misconduct, and knew or should have 
known that the act was improper—double jeopardy protections 
should bar retrial of the defendant. 
This proposal is supported by analogy to recent case law in Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence, specifically Crawford v. Washington.  
Prior to Crawford, in deciding whether a prosecutor could admit hear-
say against a defendant at trial, the rule was that the defendant did 
not have the right to cross-examine his accuser as long as a trial judge 
decided that the hearsay being offered against him was “reliable.”  
The Crawford Court held, however, that “[d]ispensing with confronta-
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tion because testimony is obviously reliable [via a judicial determina-
tion] is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obvi-
ously guilty.”212
Likewise, with regard to prosecutorial misconduct, the current 
rule is that a defendant is not entitled to a trial free of prosecutorial 
misconduct as long as the trial judge, or later the appellate judge, de-
cided that there was strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt even 
without the misconduct.  In other words, “if [a defendant] is obvi-
ously guilty as charged, he has no fundamental right to be tried 
fairly.”213
In order to preserve this most fundamental constitutional right, 
the use of judicial discretion must be replaced with a categorical, un-
compromised right to a trial free of prosecutorial manipulation and 
abuse. 
 212 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
 213 Gershman, supra note 4, at 426 (quoting Note, Prosecutor Indiscretion: A Result of 
Political Influence, 34 IND. L.J. 477, 486 (1959)). 
